The experiences gained by the Corps for the fight against counterfeiting and other related illegal activities have brought one to believe that a global approach has become more and more essential for tackling the phenomenon. Developing analysis techniques and increasing the ability to detect the risk factors in time is today crucial for the implementation of the intervention strategies.
The evaluation of the risk factors are based on the following:
General surveys of the phenomenon and of the national and international scenario Sectorial analysis dedicated to areas within the territory with a particular concentration of criminals;
Integration of "Intelligence" information with that coming from databases and with data obtained through commercial operations relating to port and airport areas.
In general, in addition to the well-known issue regarding the origin of goods from South Eastern Asia, which represents the most consistent channel, an evolution of the criminal trends has been recorded.
References made to the following:
- The use of customs and commercial documentation which can be fictitious or that can conceal the place of origin or provenance of the goods;
- Insertion of commercial routes for the sole intention of disguising the origin of the products;
- The use of cover loads;
- indication of fictitious operators, amongst consigners as well as amongst consignees, or unaware individuals;
- Fictitious or suspicious destination of goods towards third countries;
- Fraudulent modus operandi committed within the transit regime;
- Commercialisation of counterfeited products through the internet.
The places of origin are even more frequently being changed, with the adoption of routes which are at present not considered sensitive. As far as the routes of origin are concerned, it has been confirmed that in 2007, almost all the commercial shipments of counterfeited goods arrived from China. The countries mostly used for transiting have been Spain, Turkey, Greece and The United Arab Emirates. Finally, in a number of cases, commercial shipments seized in national ports revealed that these had been declared to be destined to Algeria and Tunisia.
To this regard, one must carry out in depth analysis, in the light of the most recent investigative experiences.
A large number of operational cases have revealed the tendency on behalf of the criminal organisations to alternate the importation of goods to customs offices in Italy as a final destination with operations carried out in various EU member state ports, from which shipments of goods arrive and are put in free circulation, making it all extremely difficult to detect the moment in which the goods enter the Italian territory.
A more sophisticated method is the adoption of circumventing techniques used by exploiting the weak spots of some customs transit procedures. More specifically, this modus operandi is based on the introduction of goods coming form countries with which the European Union has entered into an agreement with, according to which, with minimum customs formalities, the payment of excise duties, fees and forms of guarantees is not requested. During the shipment procedures, an intermediate passage is included at a Community customs point of a Member State different to the one declared as the final destination; it is here where the simplified customs formalities are then carried out for the goods, for then to be put into free circulation.
By indicating fictitious entities or individuals unaware of the situation, a double advantage is therefore obtained which is to hinder the reconstruction of the various steps of the operation and also to not pay V.A.T., which happens to be the only tax applied to the goods. The system relies on the connivance of shipping agents operating on the basis of false proxies.